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ESSAY
IN GOD'S IMAGE: THE RELIGIOUS IMPERATIVE OF
EQUALITY UNDER LAW
George P. Fletcher*
This Essay argues that the principle of equality under law is best
grounded in a holistic view of human dignity. Rejecting modem attempts to
justify equality by reducing humanity to a particular factual characteristic,
it articulates a religious imperative to treat people equally by drawing on
biblical as well as modern philosophical sources. The principle "all men are
created equal," as celebrated in the Declaration of Independence and Gettys-
burg Address, draws on this holistic understanding of humanity. This ad-
mittedly romantic approach to equality generates a critique of contemporay
Supreme Court doctrine, including the prevailing approaches to strict scru-
tiny, affirmative action, and wealth discrimination.
The claim that all people are entitled to equal treatment under the
law leads a double life. It is assumed to be true and, at the same time,
treated with persistent skepticism. The claim is beyond controversy in the
sense that one could hardly imagine a modern constitution that did not
commit itself to some version of equality under the law. The form of this
commitment might resemble the American Fourteenth Amendment,
which prohibits the States from denying any person within their jurisdic-
tion "the equal protection of the laws." Or it might be akin to the straight-
forward declaration in the German Basic Law of 1949 that "all human
beings are equal under the law" [Alle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz
gleich],1 Admittedly, there are some variations on this basic commit-
ment, such as the approach of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which defines basic rights in its first thirteen articles and then, in
Article 14, prohibits discrimination on the basis of any one of a number
of listed characteristics, including race, gender, national origin, and the
catch-all expandable phrase "other status."2 Some recent constitutional
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law. An
earlier draft of this Essay was presented at Yale in April, 1999 as the Robert Litowitz
Memorial Lecture. For helpful and critical reactions, I am indebted to Ian Shapiro, Bruce
Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Paul Kahn, Steven Smith, Rogers Smith, John McCormick, Yair
Loberbaum, Russell Christopher, Steve Sheppard, Kent Greenawalt, andJeremy Waldron.
The thesis first took form in a class on the theory of equality at the Columbia University
School of Law in the spring semester of 1999. The students will readily find their imprint
in these pages. The arguments are developed further in my forthcoming book, Our Secret
Constitution: From the Gettysburg Address to the Politics of Compassion (forthcoming
2000).
1. Grundgesetz [Constitution) art. 3(1) (F.RG.).
2. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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provisions even anticipate the problem of affirmative action and hold, as
does section 15 (2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that
the commitment to equal protection of the law "does not preclude any
law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of condi-
tions of disadvantaged individuals or groups .... -"3 Of course, in states in
which the matter is left open in the constitutional text, the issue of affirm-
ative action raises fundamental questions about the meaning of equal
treatment under the law. This difficult problem aside, however, unity
prevails in contemporary Western democracies that equal treatment is an
indispensable premise of the rule of law, as we now understand it.
At the same time, skeptical voices multiply about whether the con-
cept of equality has any independent content. Peter Westen's influential
article has convinced many that equality is an empty concept, that it
merely restates an independent conclusion about whether two categories
or persons should be treated alike or differently. 4 Joseph Raz pursues the
same theme of equality's redundancy by arguing that the only relevant
question is what each group of people deserves on its own merits. His
suspicious posture becomes clear: "Rhetorical egalitarian slogans are
used by all, and serve to mask deep differences in the sources of one's
concern for social improvement."5
The strongest critique of equality as a principle ofjustice is that it is
circular. Suppose the question is whether women should be admitted to
a state military academy traditionally restricted to training male officers.6
The central issue is whether women and men are essentially alike. They
are clearly not alike with regard to the ability to give birth, but they may
be alike in most other respects. The inquiry into similarity and difference
cannot be answered, it is claimed, without specifying the purpose of mak-
ing the comparison. The specific issue is whether women and men are
alike with respect to their suitability for military careers. If they are alike
for this purpose, then it is hardly much of an inference to conclude that
women should be admitted to an exclusively male military academy. The
conclusion is anticipated in the premise that they are equally suited for
military careers. In general terms, if two groups are alike or are equal for
purposes of treatment X, then both should receive treatment X. It is only
camouflage, the argument goes, to add some abstract claim about all per-
sons being created equal or treating like cases alike.
One way to avoid circularity in the claim that like cases ought to be
treated alike is to develop a standard for affirming human equality that is
3. Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 15(2). See also Grundgesetz art. 3(3) ("No one may be prejudiced or
favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race ....").
4. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 546-47 (1982).
5. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 233 (1986).
6. This is the problem posed in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(holding that denying women admission to the Virginia Military Institute violated equal
protection).
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logically prior to the particular context for allocating some mode of treat-
ment. The argument would then run: People are intrinsically equal and
therefore must be treated equally in this particular context. This "there-
fore" has force only if two conditions are met. First, the premise of equal-
ity must be established independently of the question of how the two
groups should be treated in a particular situation. Second, the reason for
affirming the equality of all people must be sufficiently strong to warrant
the inference that they should be treated alike for a specific purpose. For
example, men and women are alike in the sense that they are both mor-
tal. Mortality does not imply that men and women should have equal
opportunities to pursue military careers. A claim of intrinsic equality
would elicit something among human beings that would compel us to
conclude that they should receive equal treatment under the law.
Some philosophers have tried to analyze human equality by search-
ing for some single factor by virtue of which we are equal. We might all
be equal because we can use language and say things like, "I am as good
as you are."7 We might all be equal in the sense that we feel pleasure and
pain.8 Or we might be equal because, in principle, we can act both ra-
tionally and reasonably. 9 All these arguments suffer from the same objec-
tion. Suppose someone could not speak, would he not be equal to other
human beings? Suppose she could not feel pleasure or pain, would that
put her outside the human community? If he were not rational, would he
not be one of us? None of these criteria alone could be an adequate test
of equality unless it was accompanied by a theory that explained why that
factor, and that factor alone, was sufficient to generate the strong sense of
human equality-the same strong sense in which Lincoln claimed that
Americans were dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal. 10
Even if we could isolate the single factor that explained human
equality, we would run into another problem: reasoning from the prem-
ise of human equality to equality under the law. Suppose that the in-
tended discrimination has nothing to do with the single feature that
makes us equal. If that single feature is, let us say, the ability to speak,
that feature is not called into question by discriminating against children
born out of wedlock. If confronted with a charge of unfair dis-crimina-
tion, a legislator could respond, "Yes, we recognize that you are equal
with respect to the ability to speak, but you are not equal with respect to
the marital status of your parents." We end up, therefore, with a version
7. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 56 (1980).
8. SeeJeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
11-12 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970).
9. This is one way to characterize John Rawls's intense commitment to human
equality. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 504-12 (1971).
10. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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of Westen's argument that the concept of equality requires filling out the
purpose for which we make the inquiry."
The only way to generate a sound premise of intrinsic equality, I sub-
mit, is to find a concept of equality that is holistic in nature. It must apply
to every person merely because he or she is a person, and therefore it
must be independent of particular criteria and particular purposes.
There must be something about us as equal persons that requires our
equal treatment. The desiderata, therefore, are two. The conception of
equality must be categorical and holistic, and it must assert a basis for
inferring that equally situated persons require equal treatment. The
question is whether any theory of equality could possibly meet these two
requirements.
I.
The first question on the agenda, then, is what kind of intrinsic
claims of equality are available to us. One answer might be that all indi-
viduals are of infinite human dignity (equal in being unbounded in
value) and therefore deserve the same or equivalent treatment. This re-
sponse appeals to the German liberal, tradition drawing primarily on the
moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In the American context, the foun-
dational text is the resonant claim of the Declaration of Independence
that all men, all persons, are created equal. Behind those created equal
stands a Creator, who is the source of our inalienable rights "to life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness."' 2 If God has made men equal, then
the implication must be that God has invested all human beings with suf-
ficient value to entail a duty of government to accord to each person the
same, or at least equivalent, rights and duties. We might call this the
"individualist reading" of the Declaration of Independence.
The fact is, however, that when human equality was first proclaimed
in 1776, the gist of the argument was primarily collectivist rather than
individualist. The purpose of the Philadelphia resolution was to argue
that all nations had an equal right to determine their form of govern-
ance. This primary sense becomes obvious on reading the passage as a
whole:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness. That, to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
consent of the governed. That, whenever any form of government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foun-
dation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in such
11. See Westen, supra note 4, at 577-92.
12. The Declaration of Independence (1776), reprinted in American Legal History:
Cases and Materials 66 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1991) (1776).
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form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.1 3
The four critical states of the argument, highlighted in italics, are
first a recognition that all men are created equal and, second, the inference
that, as equals, they are endowed with certain inalienable rights. Third, the
purpose of government is to secure these rights. And finally, if govern-
ment fails to respect the inalienable rights of men, then it will not merit the
consent of governed, and the people will have the right to institute new
government. Thus, the case for independence flows directly from the
claim that all men are created equal. A simpler version of the same syllo-
gism would go like this: "All men are created equal. Therefore, Ameri-
cans as a nation are equal to the British and, consequently, can decide for
themselves how they wish to be governed." However the premises are
configured, the import of the argument is not that all individuals are cre-
ated equal but that all nations (all men in this collective sense) are of
equal status in their right of self-governance. In light of the Declaration's
tolerance toward slavery and the leading craftsman of these lines, Thomas
Jefferson, himself a slave owner, a more radical claim of individual equal-
ity would have been hard to reconcile with the circumstances of 1776.
In the course of time, however, the subsidiary meaning-that all in-
dividuals are equal in the sight of God-clearly did emerge. The aboli-
tionists of the 1830s and 1840s relied heavily on the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. And Abraham Lincoln memorialized the individualist
meaning forever when he reminded us that the American nation was
"conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal."1 4 The same theme reverberates through Martin Luther
King's classic speech delivered a century minus a few days after the Gettys-
burg Address:
I still have a dream.., that one day this nation will rise up and
live out the true meaning of its creed-we hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal. I have a dream that one
day on the red hills of Georgia, sons of former slaves and sons of
former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table
of brotherhood.15
Lincoln's reinterpretation of the Declaration of Independence and
the resonance of the Creator in American consciousness now dominate
the American conception of equality under law. It would be difficult to
find an equally explicit theme of the religious imperative of equality in
other legal cultures. Nothing quite like "all men are created equal" is
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in Abraham
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 734 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1969).
15. Martin Luther King, "I Have a Dream" Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial
(Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in A Testament of Hope 217, 219 (James M. Washington ed.,
1986) (emphasis added).
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ever cited in the German jurisprudence of equality16 or, so far as I know,
in any other legal culture of the world.' 7
There might be many groundings for a commitment to equality
under law. The argument might be that, as a matter of practical politics,
it is better to treat people as equals than to run the risk of disenchant-
ment, demoralization, and defiance in large segments of the population.
The argument might be that, as brothers in the nation, we should act out
of a sense of solidarity and loyalty to our fellow residents in the land.
Another consideration might be that the rule of law requires the enact-
ment of non-discriminatory laws and the non-arbitrary execution of these
laws by the executive and judiciary. These factors influence American
thinking, but we also have a distinctive theological foundation for our
commitment to equality. It may be that the religious theme has become
so important because of the enormity of the task we have faced in re-
deeming our jurisprudence from the sin of radical inequality. The strug-
gle to convert the descendants of slaves into fully equal participants in the
life of the nation has required a grounding in sources as deep as the
theology of creation.
My concern in this Essay is to explore the religious foundations for
the commitment to equality, probe their ramifications, and assay whether
the current jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has been faithful to its
theological inspiration.
IH.
One of the peculiar features of American political theory is the way
in which committed egalitarians totally ignore the theological founda-
tions of American thinking about equality. John Rawls, 18 Ronald Dwor-
kin,19 and Bruce Ackerman 20 all write as though the religious view of the
world were totally irrelevant to their egalitarian projects. Their disregard
for the theological theme proves very little, however. If there is indeed a
strong conceptual connection between Western religious thought and
16. Equivalent claims do crop up, however, in areas outside the explicit discussion of
equality. For example, for German constitutional theory, the protection of human dignity
fulfills a function parallel to doctrine based on the principle that "all men are created
equal." See the extensive treatment of this theme in Susanne Baer, Wfirde oder GIeichheit
(1995) and discussion at text accompanying infra note 61.
17. A Lexis search in the English and Canadian materials reveals no references in the
case law to the phrase "created equal" in the sense Lincoln intended. The rhetoric of the
Declaration of Independence apparently had little influence outside the United States. At
least it does not seem to figure into the argument for equal treatment under law in other
English-speaking countries.
18. See Rawls, supra note 9.
19. Dworkin writes repeatedly about "equal concern and respect" and denies the
relevance of the religious point of view to any of his arguments. For his systematic effort to
reinterpret religious concepts as secular values, see Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion
(1993).
20. See Ackerman, supra note 7.
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the principle of human equality, that connection can persist as a back-
ground philosophical assumption, even though we no longer refer to the
arguments that lead us to regard the assumption as self-evident.
True, there have been great secular moments in our national history
and in the crystallization of our values. Our founding documents, the
Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights of 1791, recognize no power
higher than the will of "We the People" and no historical mission more
compelling than the creation of a "more perfect Union." It is also true
that these great tributes to the secular mind sidestep the problem of
human equality. The Constitution did reject the hereditary class distinc-
tions known so well in the mother country, and that was a major step
forward toward an egalitarian society.2 1 Yet tolerance of slavery and the
accepted hierarchy between men and women prevented more serious at-
tention to the issue of equality as a constitutional principle.
It is no surprise, then, that speaking at the dedication of the burial
ground in Gettysburg on November 19, 1863, Lincoln skips over the secu-
lar Constitution and returns "[f ] our score and seven years" to the Decla-
ration of Independence.2 2 Here he finds language more suitable to his
religious and egalitarian temperament: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal ... "23 The laws of nature and of
nature's God entitle every people to "a separate and equal station," and
this is the basis for the claim that no government may rule without con-
sent. The end of the Philadelphia Declaration resonates with another
invocation of a higher power: "[w]ith a firm reliance on the Protection
of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our
Fortunes and our sacred Honor."24
The abolitionist movement drew heavily on the Bible, but so did the
other side. As Lincoln said in his Second Inaugural Address: "Both read
the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid
against the other."25 The Bible certainly did not determine whether one
was on the side of equal humanity or on the side of visiting the sin of
Ham on all his descendants who lived in the land of Kush (Africa) 26
Everything depends on how one approaches the limited words of scrip-
ture. Lincoln held to a moral perspective on slavery that ran deeper than
the biblical text. As he continued in the Second Inaugural: "It may seem
strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wring-
21. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (neither the federal government
nor the states may grant any "Title of Nobility").
22. See Lincoln, supra note 14.
23. Declaration of Independence, supra note 12.
24. Id. at para. 32.
25. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), reprinted in
Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, supra note 14, at 793.
26. The biblical argument for slavery, or generally for inferior treatment of Blacks,
derives in part from the interpretation of the sin of Ham, Noah's son, in uncovering his
father's nakedness. See Genesis 9:22-27. Ham fathered a series of tribes that in biblical
geography are associated with the land south of Suez or Africa. See Genesis 10:6-20.
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ing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not
that we be notjudged."2 7 He did not completely mean "let us notjudge,"
for the prosecution of the war represented a rather clear statement of
moral conviction.
The Bible no more determines the analysis of human equality than it
resolves the debate about the origins of the universe. Yet the founda-
tional texts of Western religion have offered those of an egalitarian dispo-
sition material to bolster their convictions. The text of Genesis is, in fact,
the beginning of the thread favoring equality that binds the earliest leg-
ends of creation together with Lincoln's reformulation of the Declaration
of Independence. The foundations of equality emerge in the book of
Genesis; they are restated in a secular idiom in Kant; and they come into
modem political discourse as an unquestioned assumption of the liberal
pursuit ofjustice. My view is that, if we look carefully at the text of Gene-
sis, we will find the roots of those truths that today we hold to be "self-
evident."
The major source of wisdom on human worth lies in the story of
creation itself. In the first reference to the creation of Adam in Genesis
1, the text reads:
And God said, we will make man [Adam] in our own image after
our likeness: and they shall have dominion over the fish of the
sea, and over the fowl of the heaven, and over the beasts, and
over every creeping thing upon the earth. So God created the
man in God's own image, in the image of God created God it;
male and female created God them.28
This richly ambiguous text plays easily between the singular and the
plural. God created a singular Adam. God created it-Adam. Yet "male
and female" God created them. The nagging question is whether God
created one being or two. I use the neuter pronoun "it" to refer to the
singular Hebrew pronoun oto, which is usually mistranslated from Genesis
as "him."29 I have studiously avoided gender particularity in this passage,
either in references to Adam or to God. For, as will become clear, I be-
lieve that the preferred reading of this passage is that a gender-neutral
being called God created another gender-neutral being called Adam.
Admittedly, this reading of Genesis 1 stands in uneasy tension with
the famous story of Genesis 2, which pictures a male figure-Adam-
dwelling alone in the Garden of Eden. He cannot find a helpmate
among the animals and therefore God brings a sleep over him, removes a
rib (as the Hebrew term tsela is usually translated), and fashions the rib
into a woman.3 0 It might be possible to reconcile the two stories in the
27. Lincoln, supra note 25, at 793.
28. Genesis 1:26-27 (author's translation).
29. In his new translation of the Bible, Everett Fox agrees with the use of "it" to refer
to the gender-neutral creation of the first human being. See Everett Fox, The Five Books
of Moses 15 & n.27 (1995).
30. See Genesis 2:18-23.
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following way. In Genesis 1, God creates a singular being that is both
male and female. Rashi, the medieval Jewish commentator, raises the
possibility that Adam is to be understood as a single bi-gendered being
with two sides, a male side and a female side.3' In Genesis 2, God sepa-
rates the single being into two, thus simultaneously creating a male Adam
and a female later to be called Eve. The Hebrew word translated as "rib"
[tsela] could be read as referring to a whole side of the hermaphrodite
being.3 2
A longer history of critical scholarship supports the distinct origins of
the two stories of creation. The first story belongs to the so-called priestly
tradition of the "E" text, in which God is referred to as simply Elohim.
Genesis 2, beginning with verse 4, belongs to the 'J" tradition, in which
God is referred to by the pair of titles: Adonai Elohim.3 3 These Hebrew
terms are usually rendered in English as "Lord" and "Lord God." The
word "God" translates the Hebrew tetragramaton Yud-Heh-Vav-Heh, also
known in English as Jehovah, thus the use of the letter 'J" to denote the
texts that refer to the dual name "Lord God." This difference in the title
of God, the primary actor in the story, should alert us to the possibility of
even more profound disparities.
The most radical difference between the two stories is, in fact, the
way in which God acts in the process of generating Adam. In the first,
God creates Adam, which is understood to mean that God creates ex
nihilo;34 in the second story, God fashions Adam from the dust of the
ground and then fashions Eve from Adam's rib or side.35 Even more sig-
nificantly for our purposes, in Genesis 1, God creates Adam in his own
image. Whatever this very suggestive term "image" [tselem] means, it
clearly sets the first story apart from the second, for when God fashions
Adam from the soil, God has no model or image to guide His reworking
of the raw material. In Genesis 2, we search in vain for the idea that the
Adam made from the ground, the Adam from which Eve is extracted, was
made in the image of God.
Both of these ideas of Genesis 1-the act of creation ex nihilo and the
principle of creation in the image of God-are central to understanding
the moral force of the proposition that all men are created equal. How
these links are forged requires some explanation, for the connection be-
tween the Genesis tradition and the principle of human equality is hardly
obvious. If we follow the legend of Genesis 2, with the resulting expul-
sion from the Garden of Eden, we encounter the basis for patriarchy that
31. See Rashi, Commentary, in Chumash 7 (A.M. Silbermann trans., 1934).
32. See id. at 12.
33. See The Anchor Bible: Genesis 3 (E.A. Speiser trans., 1964).
34. The Hebrew root is Bet-Resh-Aleph. This is the same verb that is used in the first
line of Genesis to describe God's creation of the world.
35. The Hebrew root is Yud-Tsadik-Resh and implies a previous object from which the
new thing is fashioned.
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John Locke and many contemporary readers find objectionable. 3 6 Eve is
cursed for having induced Adam to eat of the fruit; she is told in Genesis
3:16, "your desire shall be for your husband and he shall rule over you."3 7
This and other stories in Genesis readily support patriarchal institutions.
For several reasons, an exponent of human equality should attribute
greater authority to Genesis 1 than to Genesis 2. It is only when we trace
ourselves to a single entity--"in the image of God created God it, male
and female created God them"-that we can seriously believe that we are
all created equal.3 8 If we have tvo original beings-one male and one
female-there is no reason to believe that they are of equal status. And if
the tale of their creation omits all reference to the dignifying unifying
image of God, then we should not be surprised that the legend of the
Garden issues an injunction of hierarchy between men and women. To
overcome the bias of race, gender, and all the other distinctions that sep-
arate us, we must find our source in a single image of humanity, a single
entity that partakes of the highest value that we can express.
The ideological enemies of universal human equality are several.
One is the legend of multiple original beings, such as Adam and Eve in
Genesis 2, with the ever-present possibility that one of the original beings
will be regarded as superior to the others. Another enemy of human
equality is the doctrine of karma and reincarnation-namely, the belief
that a prior life of merit or demerit accounts for our station in the pres-
ent life. As suggested in Hinduism and Buddhism, the karma of our
prior lives explains the rampant inequality that we observe all around
US.
3 9
Though one could imagine other religious traditions supporting a
conception of innate equality, there is no doubt that the assumption of
equality in the West has its most plausible source in the myth that we
trace to Genesis 1.40 We are descendants of a single being made in the
36. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 174 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)
(1698) (arguing that Genesis should not be interpreted as giving authority to men over
women).
37. Genesis 3:16.
38. Genesis 1:27. Samson Hirsch, a nineteenth-century commentator, argued that
Genesis 1 suggests that only both sexes, in equal dignity, can solve humanity's problems.
See Menachem Kasher, Encyclopedia of Biblical Interpretation 66 (H. Freedman trans.,
1953).
39. For a discussion of karma in Buddhism, see Rebecca Redwood French, The
Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet 36, 63-64 (1995). For a discussion
of karma in Hinduism, see generally Karma: An Anthropological Inquiry (Charles F. Keyes
& E. Valentine Daniel eds., 1983).
40. The Koran appears to support the view of Genesis 1, explaining that men and
women were created simultaneously from the same source: "Men, have fear of your Lord,
who created you from a single soul. From that soul He created its mate, and through them
He bestrewed the earth with countless men and women." Koran 4:1 (NJ. Dawood trans.,
Penguin Books 1990); see also Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining
Muslim Women's Rights, 12 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1, 26 (1997) (arguing that the Koran
"states clearly and repeatedly that we were all created from the same nafs (soul)"). For a
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image of God; since we all share a common origin, we can understand
the rhetoric that we are all brothers and sisters and that we share a single
universal humanity.
The only problem with this thesis is that Genesis itself contains no
explicit assertion of human equality. The imperative to treat all human
beings equally never emerges explicitly as a commandment either of the
Noahite covenant applicable to all peoples or in the covenant with the
Hebrews at Mount Sinai. Nevertheless, creation in the image of God car-
ries implications that lead to the thesis of human equality as we under-
stand it in the West.
Let us take Genesis 1 as our point of departure and assume that a
single hermaphrodite being was created in the image of a gender-neutral
God. What follows from this special attribute of the single being created
in Genesis 1? Somehow this special quality of replication of the divine
image is passed to all of Adam and Eve's offspring, whether male or fe-
male. We know this to be the biblical message, for later, in Genesis 9:6, a
few chapters after Cain killed Abel, we encounter the image of God
again, this time to explain why it is wrong for one human being to kill
another: '"hoever sheds man's blood by man shall his blood be shed;
for in the image of God he made Adam."4'
What is it about being made in the image of God that makes homi-
cide so clearly wrong? What is, after all, an image of God? We know what
an image is not-it is not a photograph, not a copy, not a precise replica,
not an interpretation. But an image does bear some significant relation-
ship to the original, and in this context the point seems clear that human
beings partake of the ultimate value associated with the Creator of the
Universe.
There can be no higher being on earth than that which partakes of
the divine. Therefore, no one can claim that he is superior to his in-
tended victim. Thus we can begin to see in the prohibition against killing
innocents the roots of theories of both human dignity and human equal-
ity. The potential killer and his victim are of equal dignity, and therefore
neither can justify killing the other. Self-defense becomes possible only
because aggressors themselves challenge the equality of their intended
victims and thus become subject to violent repression.42
further discussion of the status of women in Islam and the Koran, see Asghar Ali Engineer,
The Rights of Women in Islam (1992).
41. Genesis 9:6.
42. The religious rationale for permitting homicide in self-defense is, in fact, not so
simple. One problem is whether the rationale for killing in self-defense should be treated
as official punishment, subject to all the rules governing courts that impose punishment.
For the rabbinical response to this problem, see George P. Fletcher, Punishment and Self-
Defense, 8 L. & Phil. 201 (1989) (contrasting the assumption ofJewish duty-oriented and
Western rights-based criminal jurisprudence); George P. Fletcher, Self-Defense as a
Justification for Punishment, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 859 (1991) (discussing sources of self
defense in Jewish law, particularly the duty to use force to rescue a third party or resist an
intruder into one's home).
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The same basic structure of thought is found in Kant's moral theory.
Each innocent human life has a dignity beyond price.43 The humanity in
each of us is of infinite value, and this explains why we must respect the
humanity of others as we respect the humanity in ourselves. We cannot
use another person merely as a means to an end,44 and we may commit
neither homicide nor suicide.4 5 It follows that no human life could be
more valuable than any other and that all human beings are perforce of
equal value. As this argument is developed in the Prolegomenon to the Meta-
physics of Morals, Kant does not explicitly assert the essential equality of
human beings. Yet, the entire argument that we must respect the dignity
of others as well as ourselves is instinct with the assumption of human
equality. Significantly, Kant developed this argument in 1785-contem-
poraneous with both the Declaration of Independence and the French
Revolution. It is as though philosophy was struggling to keep up with the
equality-inspired rebellions against George Ill and Louis XVI.
The structure of Kant's thinking closely parallels the reasoning of
Genesis. Kant's idea of universal humanity functions as the secular ana-
logue to creation in the image of God. Both premises generate the strict
prohibition against killing innocent non-aggressors. The prohibition
against killing, in turn, permits the inference that the potential killer and
victim are of equal value. This equality is possible because both are of
infinite value, and because no human being could be superior to any
other, it follows that we are all created equal.
No particular feature of our existence renders us equal in the image
of God or in our universal humanity. The theory of equality turns out to
be not analytic, but holistic. We recognize our innate equality not be-
cause we value the intelligence, the memory, the capacity for language, or
any other particular feature of other human beings. We recognize each
other as human, and our equality as humans, because we grasp our non-
analyzable resemblance. We relate not by partaking of a single feature
that distinguishes us from animals but by way of sharing a common im-
age. There is probably no better expression of this holistic sense of hu-
manity than that which we find in Shylock's pleas for recognition. Chal-
lenging Antonio's contempt for him, Shylock inquires:
And what's his reason? I am ajew. Hath not ajew eyes? [H] ath
not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, pas-
sions? [Fled with the same food, hurt with the same weapons,
subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed
and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is? If
you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh?
43. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 52-53 (Robert P.
Wolff ed., Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (1785).
44. See id. at 54.
45. See id. at 45, 54.
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[I]f you poison us, do we not die?-And if you wrong us, shall
we not revenge?46
The composite renders Shylock human. It is not a particular feature,
but the whole, the verbal image in which we cannot but recognize our-
selves. One could imagine this speech recast in a debate between an abo-
litionist and a slave holder: "Hath not a slave eyes? If you prick him does
he not bleed?" There is no better case for equality than Shakespeare's
art. It is effective precisely because it speaks in an image of a complex
being. It does not strain the quality of humanness by reducing it to a
single feature that we can reject or ignore. Rather, it allows the humanity
of the other to ease by our defenses, as the wave breaks and flows past any
barrier that we place in its way.
The holistic approach to the "image of God" is critical to the prohibi-
tion of homicide. If a single feature defined the quality of humanness
that precluded the intentional killing of human beings, we might have
endless debates about whether the prohibition extended to people of low
intelligence, to those without speech, to those in comas, to those with no
enjoyment of life. We would have the same debate about homicide that
many proponents of easy abortion propose with regard to fetuses that
lack some supposedly essential feature of "personhood."47 The only rea-
son that the universal prohibition against homicide survives is that we
refuse to engage in the chimerical pursuit of the single observable feature
that makes us human.
The holistic approach to humanity reflects a romantic sensibility. It
favors a situational response over the analysis of factors and reduction of
wholes to parts. It favors innate human understanding over scientific for-
mulae. And here we encounter a major paradox in modem legal
thought. The romantic sensibility runs through the legal culture, yet we
are loath to recognize its presence. When it suddenly asserts itself in legal
opinions, as in justice Stewart's famous remark that he knows pomogra-
phy when he sees it,48 we smile politely. We think, mistakenly, that the
methodology of images lacks precision. It is wanting in legal virtue. We
crave the scientific, the analytic, a litmus test for critical concepts. Noth-
ing could be further from the nature of the problem of recognizing and
valuing humanity.49
46. William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice act 3, sc. 1.
47. See the embarrassing analysis by Dworkin that fetuses have no claim to protection
prior to developing the ability to feel pain, which may be indicated by electrical brain
activity, in Dworkin, supra note 19, at 17. However the debate about abortion is resolved,
the status of the fetus should not depend on the pursuit of some single magical component
of humanity.
48. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
49. The romantic method runs through many of my articles, but I have never
managed to analyze the approach systematically. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972) (arguing that the use of metaphors
and imagery represents a style of reasoning that may be necessary to protect innocent
victims from socially useful risks); George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89
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III.
The foundation of our jurisprudence of equality, therefore, is the
proposition of the Declaration of Independence: "All men are created
equal." Yet the Justices of the Supreme Court rely, much less than one
would expect, on these truths that the Drafters of 1776 took to be self-
evident. The Supreme Court has cited the proposition in only twenty-
three cases, and twelve of those citations are in dissenting opinions.50
Each time the Court invokes equality in God's image, however, its simple
Harv. L. Rev. 469 (1976) (describing how the classic definition of larceny-conduct
conforming to a collective image of acting like a thief-would require eighteenth-century
courts to accept unanalyzed perception as a source of law). A good account of the
romantic method under the label "ordinary observing" is to be found in Bruce Ackerman,
Private Property and the Constitution 88-112 (1977).
50. The Supreme Court has cited the full phrase "all men are created equal" or the
modem version "all persons are created equal" in the context of precisely twenty-three
cases, appearing in either an opinion of the Court, a concurring opinion, or a dissenting
opinion. The first citation to the phrase, surprisingly, was in the notorious Dred Scott case,
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1856), in which Chief Justice Taney cites the
Declaration of Independence only to argue that those who signed it could not possibly
have meant to include slaves within the scope of "all men." But see id. at 574-75 (CurtisJ.,
dissenting) (challenging Chief Justice Taney's arguments).
Subsequently, three Justices account for the remaining twenty-two citations. First, the
great advocate of this rhetoric of equality-in-creation is Justice Stevens, who has cited the
phrase seven times in dissent, either in opinions under his own name or in opinions he has
signed. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 244 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 249 n.6 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 330 n.1 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wygant v.Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 533 n.1 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 n.3
(1976) (Stevens,J., dissenting). Second,Justice Brewer worked the phrase into three of his
opinions for the Court at the turn of the century. See Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards,
183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901); Gulf, Colorado & Santa FE Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160
(1897); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 467 (1892). Third,
Justice Bradley is credited with the first positive invocation of this phrase in his dissent in
The Slaughter-House Cases (Slaughterhouse I), 83 U.S. 36, 116 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) and his concurrence in Butcher's Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Co.,
v. Crescent City Live Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co. (Slaughterhouse II), 111 U.S.
746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring).
A total of twelve of the twenty-three references appear in dissent. In addition to the
eight dissents associated with Stevens and Bradley, five more were registered. See Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); id.
at 388 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 317 (1963) (StewartJ., dissenting); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 99 n.2 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 487 (1937) (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
The remaining cases in which 'all men are created equal" appears are Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 606-07 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (invoking the phrase for an
unusual thesis: 'A government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are
created equal when it asserts that God prefers some"); City of Richmond v.JA Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 348 (1970)
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affirmation has a startling rhetorical effect. A good example is the dissent
of Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan in Matthews v. Lucas, uphold-
ing discrimination against children born out of wedlock. The Social Se-
curity Act prescribes that for the purposes of awarding survivor benefits,
the administrator could permissibly presume that "legitimate children"
were financially dependent on their decedent-parent, but that children
born out of wedlock were not. In response to the challenge that this
presumption unfairly discriminated against so-called illegitimates, the
Supreme Court upheld the statute. The dissent of the three justices be-
gins with a simple affirmation of human equality:
The reason why the United States Government should not add
to the burdens that illegitimate children inevitably acquire at
birth is radiantly clear: We are committed to the proposition
that all persons are created equal.5 '
The argument is compelling in this context but out of place in
others. The typical case of equal protection analysis responds to some
seemingly arbitrary legislative classification, say, permitting optometrists
but not opticians to perform eye examinations.5 2 It would be slightly lu-
dicrous to begin an argument about whether opticians should have the
same professional privileges as optometrists by recalling that all men are
created equal.
The appropriateness of affirming the intrinsic equality of all people
in some equal protection disputes but not in others enables us to clarify a
fundamental cleavage between two radically different kinds of legal
problems. In one form of contested discrimination-call it "caste-rein-
forcing discrimination"-the legislative decision reflects a culturally-
rooted differentiation between the privileged and the disadvantaged. If
we are comparing whites and blacks, men and women, citizens and aliens,
"legitimate" and "illegitimate" children, heterosexuals and homosexuals,
we have no doubt about whether in American society one of these pair-
ings has traditionally carried greater privilege. The same could be said
for distinctions common in other cultures-between aristocrats and com-
moners in Britain, between Brahmin and untouchables in India, between
ordinary citizens and Eta (descendants of those who once slaughtered
animals) in Japan, and between women with children and barren women
in the biblical culture. In all these cases, the very existence of the distinc-
tion implies privilege. The roots of this superiority may be cultural or
religious, and because they are widely supported in the society, they are
(Brennan, J., concurring); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
It is worth noting that only a slim majority of these twenty-three decisions raise equal
protection issues: Adarand, Croson, Wygant, Fullilove, Bakhe, Mathews, Bell Senn, Cotting,
Allgeyer, Ellis, Slaughterhouse H, and Slaughterhouse L The second most common theme is
freedom of religion, to which the rhetoric of being "created equal" had relevance in five
cases: Agostini, Lee, Schempp, McGowan, and Church of the Holy Tinity.
51. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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likely to be reflected in legal arrangements that reinforce the indigenous
assumptions of hierarchy.
In other cases-let's call them simply "arbitrary legislation"-the
statutory law invokes a new categorization that comes across as haphazard
or arbitrary. A statute that imposes sterilization as a penalty for theft but
not for embezzlement obviously treats one group of people worse than
another.53 But this differentially harsh treatment neither responds to nor
reinforces cultural assumptions about thieves in contrast to embezzlers-
unless, of course, the statute incorporates unarticulated class-based as-
sumptions about the kinds of people who are likely to steal as opposed to
those who are prone to embezzlement. If a licensing scheme assumes
that optometrists are better qualified to examine eyes than are opticians,
this kind of superiority is arguably justified on the basis of longer and
better professional training. It hardly springs from culturally-rooted no-
tions of intrinsic merit.
The striking fact about caste-reinforcing discrimination is that it is
not arbitrary. It reflects and incorporates deeply-held local biases. The
impetus for the differentiation lies in indigenous assumptions that, for
reasons best known to the initiated, some people are intrinsically superior
to others. Because one group is thought to be intrinsically superior, it
deserves better treatment from the state.
When the state undertakes to distribute benefits and burdens for a
particular purpose, it cannot award the benefits or impose the burdens
on everyone. Therefore, it must design a system of categories for decid-
ing the reach of its legislative program. This kind of line-drawing, which
has nothing to do with ingrained cultural stereotypes, can give rise to
claims of discrimination, and sometimes these claims prevail in the
Supreme Court. Typical is the victory in Morey v. Doud,54 which blew the
whistle on a regulatory plan for currency transfers that had awarded a
privileged position to American Express. The danger in legislative
schemes allocating economic and social benefits is that they frequently
have political sinecures built into them.55 The Equal Protection Clause
provides a good way for testing whether these legislative schemes for dis-
tributing benefits unfairly advantage or tax a particular group. The bene-
fits and burdens are thought to be fair if they stand in an appropriate
relationship, typically called a "rational" relationship to the legislative
goal. "Rational" turns out to be the opposite of "arbitrary." If the legisla-
tion is rationally designed, it is not arbitrary and therefore not defective
under the Equal Protection Clause.
53. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (holding that sentencing
discrimination violates equal protection).
54. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
55. Illustrative of these sinecures was the monopoly awarded to selected butchers in
New Orleans after the Civil War. Litigation over this monopoly, which the privileged
butchers won, set back the development of the Equal Protection Clause for generations.
See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
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Conventional "equal protection" doctrine recognizes the distinction
I have in mind; the only differences are in the labeling and in the attitude
toward judicial assessment. Cases of caste-reinforcing dis-crimination re-
quire the strict scrutiny of suspect classifications, while potentially arbi-
trary legislation requires only the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis
test. The difference is supposedly only one of degree, and there can be
various levels of scrutiny between the two extremes. Distinctions based
on gender, for example, require only intermediate scrutiny.5 6 The
stricter the scrutiny, the stronger the state interest required to justify the
apparent discrimination.5
7
The difference between the two categories of discrimination, how-
ever, runs deeper than suggested in the conventional doctrine. While the
treatment for arbitrary legislation need not change, we should think dif-
ferently about the practice of caste-reinforcing discrimination. In those
cases where it makes sense to rely on the premise of human equality in
the Declaration of Independence-namely, in cases of caste-reinforcing
discrimination-the realization of equality under law should be treated as
a categorical imperative. The courts are obligated in all cases to bring our
legislation into conformity with our understanding of intrinsic human
equality. No state interest can justify practices that both reflect and rein-
force cultural assumptions about the intrinsic superiority of whites over
blacks, men over women, "legitimate" over "illegitimate" children, or
heterosexuals over homosexuals. This, at least, is the way our law of equal
protection would look if the courts began to take human equality
seriously.
IV.
Kant secularized the image of God by capturing the idea in his no-
tion of universal humanity, but even as he presented biblical ideas in a
modem idiom, he remained close to the spirit of the biblical text. Estab-
lishing the common theme between Genesis and Kant emboldens me to
adapt a Kantian principle to our understanding of equality: Realizing
equality is ajudicial imperative. It is a categorical obligation incumbent
on the courts and on state institutions. Our dedication to the proposition
"all persons are created equal" requires the elimination of all caste-rein-
forcing policies of the state. In this view of the matter, there is no room
for the kind of reasoning that infects the current doctrine of strict scru-
tiny, which tolerates patent discrimination for the sake of compelling
state interests.5 8 To those who believe that it is all a matter of balancing
56. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (announcing the standard of
intermediate scrutiny for gender discrimination); see also United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996).
57. See Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-6, at 1453 (2d ed.
1988).
58. Washington courts, for instance, have upheld a state statute imposing more
rigorous rules against aliens possessing guns than against citizens committing the same
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the value of equality against the interests of the state in legislating on the
basis of inequality, the appropriate response is to paraphrase the master:
Woe unto him who searches in the winding paths of the theory of inter-
est-balancing for some technique to uphold the debasing of human dig-
nity.-5 9 And to bring the point home, we should recall a saying that Kant
attributes to the rabbis: "Ifjustice goes, there is no longer any value in
men's living on the earth."60
It is helpful, in this context, to grasp the analogy between the Ger-
man commitment to protect human dignity and the caste-reaffirming
branch of equal protection law. The underlying value commitment of
post-war German law, a commitment drawn from Kantian sources,
emerges in the first article of the 1949 Basic Law: "Human dignity is invi-
olable. It is the duty of the state to protect and respect [human dig-
nity]." 61 This proposition has a moral force analogous to "all men are
created equal." In the same way that Lincoln revived and interpreted a
phrase from the Declaration of Independence to redeem the nation from
the sin of slavery, post-war German lawmakers drew on the Kantian tradi-
tion to refound a nation that had descended into the evils of National
Socialism. The commitment to equality expressed the value precisely op-
posed to American slavery as human dignity, for the Germans, was the
value most widely abused under the Third Reich. When a nation seeks to
establish itself on the basis of a fundamental value, it hardly makes sense
to treat that value as contingent and partial, subject to being overridden
by competing interests of the state. It would be ludicrous for a German
to claim that human dignity is "unassailable" and then proceed to reason
that the state could sometimes subject people to demeaning treatment,
violating their dignity, because this deviation was required by "compelling
state interests." Similarly, in the equal protection cases where human dig-
nity is an issue-namely, in the caste-reaffirming cases-we should regard
the commitment to equality as an absolute. In those cases where it ap-
plies, the postulate "all men are created equal" brooks no exceptions.
The implication of treating equality as a judicial imperative is that
supposed state interests cannot justify our toleration of caste-reinforcing
discrimination. This conclusion flows for the suspect classes that we read-
ily recognize-race, national origin, gender, birth out of wedlock, and
alienage62 (at least in the state courts). It means that there are no de-
grees of scrutiny-no way to express a commitment to the equality of
women for some purposes but not others. On this view, a military draft
acts. See State v. Acosta-Perez, No. 20900-4-11, 1998 Wash. App. Lexis 102 (Wash. App. Ct.
1998); State v. Hernandez-Mercado, 879 P.2d 283 (Wash. 1994).
59. This is based on the passage in Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 141
(Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
60. Id.
61. Grundgesetz art. 1(1) (author's translation).
62. On the special problem posed by federal jurisdiction over aliens, see Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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that takes only men or a law of statutory rape that punishes only men is
clearly unconstitutional. 63 And if we ever did anything as silly as adopting
the Russian rule on capital punishment, a rule that exempts women from
the death penalty, 64 we would clearly run afoul of our dedication to the
proposition that all persons are created equal. As Kant teaches us, we
realize our equality not only in receiving benefits but also in accepting
equal responsibility under the criminal law.
65
As we have seen in our derivation of the commitment to equality,
there is a close connection between punishment and the emergence of
equality as a normative ideal.66 This connection should help to better
appreciate Kant's controversial theory of retributive punishment. As de-
veloped in his Philosophy of Right in 1797, the state must guarantee equal-
ity in two dimensions of criminal punishment. It must seek a sanction
that restores equality between offender and victim, and it must respect
equality among offenders. 67 Plea bargaining is prohibited, as it should
be. All offenders must be held responsible, out of respect both for the
law and for the offenders themselves.
This is the core of a liberal theory of law, one that adheres to strict
equality among persons. And as Kant makes clear in the famous example
of the duty to punish in the island society about to disband, the liberal
theory of law has biblical roots. The problem that inheres in failing to
punish-the vice of failing to treat the equally-deserving equally-is that
blood guilt for the crime will be on our hands.68 By failing to punish, we
become complicitous in the crime. This is the thinking that prevails in
the contemporary approach toward war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity. The effort to establish an International Criminal Court reflects
the teachings of the K6nigsberg philosopher. Impunidad-allowing war
crimes and crimes against humanity to go unpunished-is itself a great
evil. And in the Kantian view, the evil both of crime and of impunidad is
that they violate our commitment to equality under law.
69
63. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is willing to tolerate discrimination in these
areas. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (upholding an exemption for
women from selective service); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S.
464 (1981) (upholding the application of statutory rape only to male defendants and
female victims).
64. See UK RF [Russian Criminal Code] § 59. I wrote a detailed criticism of this
provision while it was still in draft form. See George P. Fletcher, In Gorbachev's Courts,
N.Y. Rev. Books, May 18, 1989, at 13.
65. Kant expresses contempt for the prisoner who would accept a punishment less
than he deserves simply to further his self-interest. See Kant, supra note 43, at 142-43.
66. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
67. See Kant, supra note 43, at 142-45.
68. See id. at 142.
69. See Preamble to the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, U.N.
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) ("Determined to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes .... .").
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Tolerating castes in a society supposedly dedicated to human equal-
ity is a form of impunidad-a failure to act that allows evil to triumph.
The state cannot sit idly by as caste differentiations survive and flourish,
and it cannot participate in any way in the perpetuation of these popular
prejudices.
Of course, there are some difficulties when a legislative scheme has a
caste-affirming impact. A good example of the problems at the frontier
arose in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,70 where the legislative
scheme at issue prohibited the building of homes for the mentally re-
tarded without the kind of permit required to erect a prison near a resi-
dential neighborhood. The Court balked at treating the mentally re-
tarded as a "suspect class" but struck down the zoning requirement, as a
violation of the rational basis test.
The special cases involving the mentally retarded or the handi-
capped enable us to realize the relative simplicity of the affirmative action
problem.71 Legislation to help the disadvantaged obviously has a tone
and quality different from practices that stigmatize particular classes and
reinforce their subordination. Affirmative action for historically disad-
vantaged groups should remain a matter of legislativejudgment. The Ca-
nadian solution seems to be on the mark.72 The Constitution should
neither prohibit nor require historically contingent measures to over-
come socially induced forms of domination.73 As amended in 1994, the
German Basic Law also recognizes affirmative action for women as com-
patible both with the principles of respecting human dignity and equality
under law.74
If we take the elimination of castes as the aspiration of the Equal
Protection Clause, then we must acknowledge and overcome the willful
indifference of American jurisprudence to wealth discrimination, particu-
larly to discriminatory patterns of education that contribute to the per-
70. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
71. Justice Stevens began the transformation of his thinking about affirmative action
by reflecting on the propriety of special legislation benefiting the handicapped. See City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring). He later realized that the essential issue
raised by benign discrimination was whether legislation furthered a caste system or was
designed to counteract it: "There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a
policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens,J.,
dissenting).
72. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(2) (allowing affirmative
action programs).
73. John Ely developed this argument many years ago. See John Hart Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727-41 (1974).
See also John C. Livingston, Fair Game? Inequality and Affirmative Action (1979). I am
fully aware that the current Supreme Court has rejected the relevance of "benign
discrimination." See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200; see also City of Richmond v. J.- Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
74. See Grundgesetz art. 3(2); see also id. at art. 3(3), which explicitly permits special
assistance for the handicapped.
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petuation of the class system. The great culprit is San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,75 which actually upholds a system of school fi-
nancing in which people living in poor neighborhoods pay a significantly
higher rate of tax and attend worse schools. That the state should partici-
pate in a system of education that gives greater opportunity to the rich is
an unspeakable injustice. All children are created equal; they are entitled
to an equal opportunity to escape the economic conditions into which
they are born. A legal system that does not recognize that elementary
truth could not possibly think of itself as a liberal system committed to
equality under law. Fortunately, state supreme courts have ruled against
Rodriguez on the basis of their state constitutions.76
If American judges and justices were not so insulated and parochial
in their thinking, they would realize that a result like Rodriguez would be
unthinkable in many European supreme courts. Even without appealing
to the value of human dignity, German courts would summarily rule that
avoidably unequal school financing violated the principle that, at the start
of their lives, all children should enjoy an equal opportunity of personal
development. 77
In my view, it would not help much to adoptJustice Marshall's juris-
prudence, set forth in his compelling dissent in Rodriguez, endorsing a
more flexible scale of graded "scrutiny" based on the classification and
issue at stake. 78 The system of egalitarian justice that I am advocating
disavows all scrutiny and interest balancing in cases that challenge caste-
based inequalities. Closer to the mark is Justice Stevens, who regularly
draws inspiration from the religious foundation of equal protection and
quotes the principle that all persons are created equal. 79 The basis of
75. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
76. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (holding that a public
school financing system that relies heavily on local property taxes and causes substantial
disparities among individual school districts in amount of revenue available per pupil
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
77. See 1 Maunz-Dfdrig, Grundgesetz: Kommentar 3:44 (34th supp. 1998) ("The
[German] Constitution is committed to equality of opportunity [Startgleichheit] in the
context of education for children and young people, a presupposition for the later
flourishing of their personalities." (author's translation)). Additional support comes from
the prohibition against wealth discrimination as an expression of the Sozialstaat [state
committed to social welfare]. See Grundgesetz art. 20(1). These prohibitions have
generated a detailed law on permissible line-drawing in the tax systems. See Bruno Schmit-
Bleibtreu & Franz Klein, Komnentar zum Grundgesetz 186-95 (9th ed. 1999). Also note
the perspicacious comparative comment by the leading German scholar on the theory of
equality, Gerhard Leibholz, Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und das Bonner Grundgesetz,
66 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 193, 197 (1951) (author's translation):
Or think, let's say, about the implications of classical liberalism: in the United
States, the Supreme Court has taken a negative stand, in line with 19th century
ideas, against protective legislation favoring socially-oppressed classes. We have
come to regard this protective legislation as the true expression of ideas of
equality and justice.
78. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. See the views of Justice Stevens, supra notes 50 and 71.
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egalitarian jurisprudence should not be the state and its interests but,
rather, the intrinsic equality of all persons created in God's image. When
the state tolerates ingrained social attitudes that violate the principle of
human equality, it permits the evil to escape unchallenged. It becomes
responsible for the impunidad.
The focus of egalitarian jurisprudence must not be the state and its
interests but rather individuals and their dignity. Whether we ground
our respect for human beings in the religious message of Genesis or in
Kant's secularized version of the same teaching, we must begin in awe of
a mystery of the human condition that we cannot completely explain.
Though we are still searching for the grounds of our faith, we are dedi-
cated to the proposition that all people are equal and are entitled to
equal treatment under law.
